































































Internal consistency and compatibility of
the 3Rs and 3Vs principles for project
evaluation of animal research
Matthias Eggel1 and Hanno Würbel2
Abstract
Using animals for research raises ethical concerns that are addressed in project evaluation by weighing
expected harm to animals against expected benefit to society. A harm–benefit analysis (HBA) relies on two
preconditions: (a) the study protocol is scientifically suitable and (b) the use of (sentient) animals and harm
imposed on them are necessary for achieving the study’s aims. The 3Rs (Replace, Reduce and Refine) provide
a guiding principle for evaluating whether the use of animals, their number and the harm imposed on them
are necessary. A similar guiding principle for evaluating whether a study protocol is scientifically suitable has
recently been proposed: the 3Vs principle referring to the three main aspects of scientific validity in animal
research (construct, internal and external validity). Here, we analyse the internal consistency and compat-
ibility of these two principles, address conflicts within and between the 3Rs and 3Vs principles and discuss
their implications for project evaluation. We show that a few conflicts and trade-offs exist, but that these can
be resolved either by appropriate study designs or by ethical deliberation in the HBA. In combination, the 3Vs,
3Rs and the HBA thus offer a coherent framework for a logically structured evaluation procedure to decide
about the legitimacy of animal research projects.
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Introduction
Every year, millions of animals are used for scientific
procedures to promote scientific discovery, advance
human and animal health and facilitate nature conser-
vation. Research on animals is regulateda on the explic-
it understanding that it will provide important new
knowledge in these domains without causing unneces-
sary harm to animals. Both maximising epistemic ben-
efit and minimising harm to animals are therefore
necessary conditions for legitimate animal research.
Minimising harm to research animals is promoted
by the 3Rs: replace, reduce and refine.1 The 3Rs repre-
sent a guiding principle according to which animal
research is legitimate only if the study aim cannot be
achieved (a) without using (sentient) animals (i.e.
replace), (b) by using fewer animals (i.e. reduce) or
(c) by using husbandry conditions and experimental
procedures that are less harmful and more conductive
to animal welfare (i.e. refine). The 3Rs are embedded in
national and international legislation and guidelines
regulating the use of animals in research (e.g. the
European Commision,2 the US Department of
Agriculture3 and the National Research Council of
the National Academies4).
Implementation of the 3Rs is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for legitimate animal research.
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Unless a study produces scientifically valid and repro-
ducible results, animals may be wasted for inconclusive
research, regardless of how little harm is imposed on
them. Similar to the 3Rs principle, the 3Vs principle
offer a guiding principle for evaluating and promoting
scientific validity in animal research.5,6 The 3Vs repre-
sent the three key aspects of scientific validity in animal
research: construct validity, internal validity and exter-
nal validity.5,7 Thus, the 3Vs principle serves to
enhance the scientific validity of study findings in
view of maximising epistemic benefit (i.e. knowledge
gain). Together, the 3Vs, 3Rs and the harm–benefit
analysis (HBA) form a coherent framework, which
enables a logically structured procedure for evaluating
the legitimacy of animal research projects (Figure 1).
This framework is based on the rule-of-law principle
of proportionality, which requires that a proposed
measure (here, an animal study protocol) is (a) suitable,
(b) necessary and (c) reasonable for achieving its aims.
The principle of proportionality is used in cases of con-
flict between different fundamental rights, legal inter-
ests or legal principles. In the case of animal research,
these include general personal rights, integrity of life
and limb, freedom of research and animal welfare.8
The 3Rs and 3Vs are not completely independent of
each other. The 3Rs not only serve animal welfare but
also help in enhancing epistemic benefit. Pain, suffering
and harm are potential confounders in animal experi-
ments (unless they are themselves targets of the
research). Minimising adverse effects on animals and
promoting animal welfare therefore help improve study
validity. Conversely, improving scientific validity also
helps in reducing the number of animals used to estab-
lish new knowledge. Consequently, animal welfare and
scientific validity are inextricably linked. Striving to
maximise both scientific validity and animal welfare is
generally a win–win strategy that should form the basis
of every study protocol.
Much of this has been known for a long time.1,9–11
So, why is there so little progress in advancing the
3Rs?12 How do we explain the high prevalence of
risks of bias13 and poor reproducibility in animal
research?14 And why do so many scientists resist adop-
tion of refinements of experimental procedures (e.g.
environmental enrichment15 and tunnel handling16)
and guidelines promoting scientific rigour (e.g.
ARRIVE guidelines17–20)?
Limited progress in advancing the 3Rs is commonly
explained by a lack of dedicated funding,12 while poor
scientific validity and the ‘reproducibility crisis’ are
mainly attributed to perverse incentives promoting
sloppy science.21 However, many scientists are con-
cerned that policies promoting scientific rigour may
stifle creativity, thereby compromising scientific prog-
ress. Similarly, many scientists perceive the 3Rs as a
nuisance or threat to animal science. Both sentiments
are unsubstantiated. The first is in stark contrast to a
large body of evidence derived from meta-research,
Figure 1. Framework for a structured evaluation procedure to decide about the legitimacy of animal studies. Based on
the principle of proportionality, it is evaluated whether a study protocol is (a) suitable, (b) necessary and (c) reasonable for
achieving the study aim(s). In the first step, suitability is determined based on the 3Vs principle. If the study protocol is
deemed sufficiently suitable for achieving the study aim(s) with respect to all 3Vs (construct, internal and external
validity), evaluation proceeds to the second step. In the second step, necessity is determined based on the 3Rs principle. If
after application of all 3Rs the use of (sentient) animals and the harm to them are deemed necessary for achieving the
study aim(s), evaluation proceeds to the third step. In the third and final step, a harm–benefit analysis (HBA) is conducted.
In case of a positive HBA, that is, if the expected benefit to society (in terms of scientific discovery, human or animal health
or nature conservation) is judged to outweigh the harms to animals (e.g. in terms of pain, injury or restrictions on the
expression of normal behaviour), the study protocol is deemed reasonable with respect to the study aim(s). All three steps
need to be met in the proposed order to justify the legitimacy of an animal study.
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indicating that a lack of scientific rigour is a major
source of poor reproducibility and a threat to scientific
progress,22 while the second is based on a misconcep-
tion of the 3Rs principle as further discussed below.
Here, we examine putative conflicts between scientific
and animal welfare considerations in animal research
by analysing the internal consistency and compatibility
of the 3Rs and 3Vs principles. We conclude that there
are some conflicts and trade-offs within and between
these principles, but also show how these can be
resolved within the framework outlined here.
Advancing both the 3Vs and the 3Rs should render
animal research more useful, as well as more humane.
3Rs and 3Vs in the context of the HBA of
animal research
A HBA is the common decision tool by which ethical
review bodies assess the legitimacy of animal
research.23 A HBA is required by EU Directive 2010/
632 and the Swiss Animal Welfare Act,24 and is implied
in the US Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory
Animals4 and the Terrestrial Animal Health Code by
the World Organization for Animal Health.25
In a HBA, a study’s benefit to society is weighed
against the harm to animals. However, as outlined
above, the HBA is only the final step of a more com-
prehensive test of the principle of proportionality.
Accordingly, two preconditions need to be met prior
to a HBA, namely that for achieving the study’s aim(s)
(a) the study protocol is scientifically suitable, which is
addressed by the 3Vs,5 and (b) the use of (sentient)
animals and the harm inflicted on them are necessary,
which is addressed by the 3Rs.5,26
Whether using animals and imposing harm on them
is necessary for achieving a study aim can only be rea-
sonably assessed for a study protocol that is suitable
for achieving that aim in the first place. From this
follows the precedence of the 3Vs over the 3Rs in the
order of the procedure of a formal HBA.8 This is an
important procedural aspect, which clarifies that the
3Rs neither threaten animal research nor compromise
its scientific validity, as assessing the 3Rs always comes
secondary to assessing the 3Vs. The ultimate decision,
however, as to whether a study protocol is deemed rea-
sonable, that is, whether the harm to the animals is
justified by the benefit of the study,5 is a moral decision
(i.e. a principled judgement about the relationship
between harm and benefit that leaves aside more fun-
damental ethical objections to invasive animal experi-
mentation), which is taken in the HBA, after adequate
implementation of the 3Vs and 3Rs has been
assured.5,26
Internal consistency and intra-conceptual
conflicts among the 3Vs
To assess the internal consistency and identify intra-
conceptual conflicts among the 3Vs, we will assess
whether measures promoting one V may conflict with
any of the other two Vs, and in case such conflicts exist,
how they can be resolved.
Construct validity versus internal validity
Construct validity refers to the level of agreement
between the animal model or outcome variable and
the quality it is meant to model or measure.7,27–29
There is no single measure of construct validity; it is
rather a judgement based on accumulated evidence,
including evidence of convergent and discriminant
validity.5,30 In contrast, internal validity refers to the
extent to which the results of a given study (e.g. differ-
ence between groups or strength of relationship
between variables) can be attributed to variation in
the independent variable(s), rather than bias intro-
duced by inadequacies in the design, conduct, analysis
or reporting of the study.7,29 Similar to construct valid-
ity, there is no single measure of internal validity. It
depends on appropriate controls (e.g. validated positive
and negative controls) and measures to prevent bias,
including randomisation, blinding, sample size calcula-
tion, as well as a priori definition of outcome variables,
data handling, statistical analysis and outcome report-
ing.29,31 Thus, construct validity refers to what is being
measured, while internal validity refers to how it is
being measured. Conflicts or trade-offs between con-
struct validity and internal validity are therefore
unlikely to exist, and we are not aware of any such
conflicts having been reported. Measures that maximise
construct validity should not interfere with internal
validity, and vice versa.
Construct validity versus external validity
External validity refers to the extent to which results of
a given study can be applied to other studies, study
conditions or animal populations (including
humans7,29,32). It thus defines the inference space of a
study, that is, the range of conditions and populations
to which the findings can reliably be generalised.33 To
assess whether results have high or low external valid-
ity, variation of study conditions or population char-
acteristics is necessary.33,34 The current practice of
rigorous standardisation in animal research entails a
high risk of detecting effects with low external validity.
External validity of rigorously standardised animal
experiments may be so low that results may even
fail to generalise to seemingly identical replicate
studies.33–38 Measures to enhance external validity
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include: splitting experiments into multiple replicate
batches,39,40 heterogenisation of study populations by
introducing systematic variation of independent varia-
bles (e.g. strain, housing conditions, test, etc.33,41,42)
and multi-centre study designs38,43.
In principle, there should be no conflicts between
construct validity and external validity. In practice,
however, there may be limitations to the study of a
construct under different conditions or in different
populations of animals. For example, an animal
model with high construct validity for a human condi-
tion may only be available in a particular mouse strain
(e.g. a specific tumour model). An alternative animal
model may have less construct validity but may also be
available in rats and primates, thereby offering the
option of a study design with higher external validity.
Should we prioritise construct validity or external
validity? This question may rarely occur, and the
answer may not be one or the other but both. Using
the model with the highest construct validity (but lim-
ited to a particular mouse strain) may be comple-
mented by using an alternative model in additional
strains or species. However, in most cases – except
for regulatory toxicology, where the use of two differ-
ent species (one rodent, one non-rodent) is mandato-
ry44 – variation of strain or species may not be
necessary. It may suffice to assess external validity in
terms of the findings’ robustness against variation in
other biologically relevant factors (e.g. age, environ-
mental conditions, etc.33,40,41).
Internal versus external validity
Experiments conducted under controlled laboratory
conditions are the gold standard of study design in
animal research. Defined treatment options, adequate
study design, measures to prevent bias (randomisation,
blinding, etc.) and stable laboratory conditions can
effectively protect results against confounding.
However, as indicated above, eliminating all potential
confounders through rigorous standardisation carries
the risk of limiting external validity of results and
thus their reproducibility and generalisability.33
Although there is no inherent conflict between inter-
nal and external validity, there may be trade-offs
between measures to improve one or the other; stand-
ardisation of a study population to genetically identical
animals kept under identical husbandry conditions may
reduce variation in the data and thus increase preci-
sion. However, such standardisation may limit the
external validity of the results to these specific stand-
ardised conditions. Because different laboratories inev-
itably standardise animal characteristics and
environmental variables to different local study con-
texts, different laboratories may produce increasingly
distinct study populations as standardisation gets more
rigorous.36 This fruitless attempt to increase precision
and reproducibility at the expense of external validity
has been referred to as the standardisation fallacy.34
Eliminating biological variation through standard-
isation is a highly inefficient strategy for generating
robust evidence. Investigating each genotype–environ-
ment interaction in a separate experiment reduces
information gain per experiment to virtually zero.
The other extreme, however, is not an efficient strategy
either. Incorporating the full range of genetic and envi-
ronmental variation into every study design would
render experiments unmanageable. The challenge is
therefore finding the right balance between biological
complexity and experimental practicability.33
Factorial designs offer plenty of options for includ-
ing biologically relevant factors (e.g. strain, sex, age or
environmental parameters) into study designs as either
fixed effects (for identifying sources of biological vari-
ation that modulate a treatment effect) or random
effects (for estimating an average effect across a
range of conditions33,45). The trade-off lies in balancing
the number of factors or factor levels against the
number of independent replicates within each factor
or factor level. Individual solutions to this trade-off
depend on the intended inference space and the sources
and magnitude of variation in the outcome variable.
Using randomised complete block designs, internal
validity can be maximised by standardisation within
blocks, while external validity can be maximised by
heterogenisation between blocks, whereby the hetero-
genisation factors should cover those factors and factor
levels that determine the targeted inference space.33
Conclusions
Taken together, there are no fundamental conflicts
between the three types of scientific validity covered
by the 3Vs principle, and only a few specific trade-
offs exist that can be resolved by specifying the
intended inference space and choosing an adequate
study design. This demonstrates the high degree of
intra-conceptual consistency of the 3Vs principle.
Internal consistency and intra-conceptual
conflicts among the 3Rs
Several publications (e.g. Olsson et al.46 and Boo
et al.47) discuss potential inconsistencies and intra-
conceptual conflicts among the 3Rs. Olsson et al.46
argue that ‘the 3Rs are rich in ambiguities, and . . .
promoting one R will sometimes directly or indirectly
conflict with promoting another’. Similarly, Boo et al.47
(see also Fenwick et al.48) concluded that ‘replacement,
reduction and refinement . . . may have a positive or
4 Laboratory Animals 0(0)
negative effect on one or both of the other Rs’.
However, we disagree with the representation of the
3Rs principle as portrayed in these publications.
The 3Rs, as conceived by Russell and Burch1 and
promoted by 3Rs centres worldwide (e.g. the UK
NC3Rs https://www.nc3rs.org.uk/ or the Swiss 3RCC
https://www.swiss3rcc.org/en/), provide a guiding prin-
ciple for performing animal research more humanely.
However, they are not a strategy for eliminating animal
research, for reducing the total number of animals used
in research or for reducing the overall suffering
imposed on them. Thus, the critique by Olsson
et al.46 that ‘there is no longer any real progress in
reducing the total number of animals used’ or that
reduction should proceed in lock step with replace-
ment, ‘as every animal test replaced by a non-animal
alternative represents a reduction in the number of ani-
mals used’ misses the point. Similarly, discussing puta-
tive conflicts between replacement and reduction, Boo
et al.47 miss the point when stating that ‘in validation
studies of replacement techniques, a comparison of the
proposed new technique with the conventional in vivo
technique is required, therefore having a negative
impact on reduction’. This understanding of the 3Rs
principle as an abolitionist strategy might explain why
many scientists perceive the 3Rs as a threat to animal
research.
Also, the 3Rs were never meant to replace ethical
evaluation inherent to a HBA. The 3Rs serve to exploit
the scope for replacement, reduction and refinement
given a targeted study aim. Whether a study protocol
is reasonable and thus justified for achieving a given
epistemic benefit, however, needs to be determined by a
HBA after having determined that the study protocol is
suitable (e.g. according to the 3Vs) and the harm
imposed on the animals is necessary (according to the
3Rs) for achieving that benefit.
This conception of the 3Rs also differs from that
portrayed by both Olsson et al.46 and Boo et al.47 in
terms of responsibility. Whereas the implementation of
the 3Rs is the sole responsibility of the researcher
(overseen by the competent authorities), overarching
goals such as phasing out animal research, reducing
total animal numbers or limiting total or maximal
harm imposed on animals may be political or societal
goals that are beyond the individual researcher’s power
and responsibility and are not part of project evalua-
tion (although this does not mean that researchers
should not be held accountable for their decisions
with regards to such goals).
Despite these considerations, intra-conceptual con-
flicts among the 3Rs do exist and need to be resolved in
view of a coherent and transparent authorisation
procedure.
Replacement versus reduction
Apart from the example of additional studies required
for validating new replacement methods, which, as dis-
cussed above, does not represent a true conflict, neither
Boo et al.47 nor Olsson et al.46 have identified other
conflicts between replacement and reduction, and we
are not aware of any other reports of such conflicts.
Replacement versus refinement
We are not aware of any true conflicts between replace-
ment and refinement. Use of foetal bovine serum (FBS)
in cell culture studies has been discussed as a potential
conflict. This would be the case if the original in vivo
procedure were less harmful than the procedure for
harvesting FBS. One foetus yields about 500 mL
FBS,49 which lasts for many in vitro experiments.
The severity of FBS collection varies with the proce-
dure, and according to the Foetal Calf Slaughter
Welfare Protocol,49 suffering caused by FBS collection
is limited to the killing of the cow, as the calf is con-
sidered to be non-sentient before it starts breathing.47
Thus, it seems unlikely for in vivo procedures to be less
harmful than in vitro alternatives. Furthermore, as
more and more serum-free media formulations for pri-
mary cell cultures and cell lines are becoming available,
this potential conflict may soon disappear.
Reduction versus refinement
Reduction and refinement are the only two components
among the 3Vs and 3Rs where true intra-conceptual
conflicts exist. This is further complicated by a
change in the meaning of the term reduction, as
reflected by the recent change in the definition by the
NC3Rs. In the original definition by the NC3Rs,
reduction referred to ‘methods which minimise the
number of animals used per experiment’. Now, it also
includes ‘methods which allow the information gath-
ered per animal in an experiment to be maximised in
order to reduce the use of additional animals’ (https://
www.nc3rs.org.uk/the-3rs). This extension is intuitively
appealing, as it places individual studies in the context
of entire research programmes and focusses on max-
imising knowledge gain per animal rather than mini-
mising the number of animals per study.33 It is also
consistent with Russell and Burch,1 who state: ‘One
general way in which great reduction may occur is by
the right choice of strategies in the planning and per-
formance of whole lines of research’. However, meth-
ods increasing the information gathered per animal or
experiment also enhance epistemic benefit. This new
definition of ‘reduction’ may thus confound the 3Rs
with the 3Vs. Although we support this adaptation
for reasons mentioned above, we recommend limiting
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its use to cases where more than a single experiment is
evaluated. In such cases, more knowledge gained per
animal in one or several experiments can be demon-
strated to reduce the total number of animals used
across all experiments. In all other cases, measures
increasing knowledge gain should be assessed in
terms of the 3Vs rather than the 3Rs.
Regardless of the definition of reduction, however,
there are several examples of conflicts between reduc-
tion and refinement. These include: the use of longitu-
dinal instead of cross-sectional studies with repeated
measurements in fewer animals instead of single meas-
urements in multiple cohorts of animals; reuse of ani-
mals for multiple experiments instead of using new
animals for each experiment; and within-subjects
instead of between-subjects study designs. In all of
these cases, it is important to ensure that the reduction
in the number of animals is balanced against additional
harm to animals by the repeated or multiple applica-
tion of procedures46 (UK NC3Rs). Such trade-offs are
not trivial, and we currently lack clear guidance on how
to weigh numbers of animals against severity of harm
in an HBA. For example, how does harm imposed by
bilateral surgery on both legs of a sample of mice com-
pare to harm imposed by unilateral surgery on only one
leg of twice as many mice?
An evaluation of such trade-offs may depend on
legislation (or may even be unresolvable within this
kind of moral framework). For example, in contrast
to German50 and Austrian51 law, the Swiss Animal
Welfare Act24 does not protect the life of animals.
This begs the question of how the number of killings
factors into this trade-off within different jurisdictions.
Conclusions
There are no fundamental conflicts between replace-
ment and reduction or refinement. There are, however,
conflicts between reduction and refinement, resulting in
specific trade-offs. In contrast to similar trade-offs
between internal and external validity, however,
trade-offs between reduction and refinement cannot
be resolved by study design. They concern normative
questions that include value judgements. Thus, the rel-
ative weight attributed to using ‘more animals, each
suffering less’ compared to using ‘fewer animals, each
suffering more’, depends on values (life, freedom
from suffering) and judgements about these values.
The responsibility for such ethical deliberation ulti-
mately rests with the competent authorities or ethical
review bodies based on a HBA and applicable law.
Thus, decisions may differ between countries, depend-
ing on different norms and jurisdictions.
This further illustrates that the 3Rs principle is nec-
essary, but not sufficient, for evaluating the legitimacy
of animal research. On the one hand, the 3Rs can only
be assessed and implemented with respect to a defined
epistemic benefit (i.e. the expected knowledge gain); on
the other hand, legitimacy requires ethical deliberation
beyond the 3Rs principles.
Compatibility of the 3Vs and 3Rs principles
In order for the 3Vs and the 3Rs to serve as comple-
mentary guiding principles in project evaluation of
animal experiments, they must be compatible, that is,
no fundamental conflicts must exist between them. An
important component of their compatibility is the step-
wise conception of our framework, which proceeds in
logical steps along the three criteria of the proportion-
ality principle (suitability, necessity and reasonable-
ness; Figure 1). Because the 3Vs and the 3Rs concern
separate questions, and because evaluation of the 3Rs
comes secondary to the 3Vs, there is little scope for
conflict. Furthermore, emerging conflicts or trade-offs
can be resolved in the HBA, when benefits to society
are weighed against harm to animals. There, the differ-
ent scenarios of giving either component of a trade-off
priority can be assessed in terms of their effects on the
resulting harm and benefits of the study.
Given the primacy of the 3Vs in the procedure of
our framework, we will now assess each of the 3Vs
against the 3Rs to evaluate compatibility of the 3Vs
and 3Rs and to identify potential conflicts between
them.
Construct validity versus 3Rs
One of the most critical questions regarding construct
validity is the model organism chosen for a study. If the
target population of a study is a particular species,
studying animals of that species guarantees the highest
construct validity. Often, however, animals are used as
model organisms for other animals, including humans,
or they are used to study biological processes that
apply to a range of species (e.g. all vertebrates or all
mammals).
To study biological processes applicable to all ani-
mals, there is generally no justification for using sen-
tient animals as non-sentient invertebrate model
organisms are available. Fruit flies (Drosophila mela-
nogaster) and nematodes (Caenorhabditis elegans) are
the preferred model organisms to study basic biological
processes, including genetics and developmental biolo-
gy, but also molecular and cellular aspects of human
diseases such as Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s and
Huntington’s chorea.52–54
To study biological mechanisms specific to verte-
brates or mammals, the use of vertebrate or mammal
model organisms is often warranted. However, for two
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reasons, it is unclear whether the model organism with
the highest construct validity is always used. First, the
principle of ‘relative replacement’ is sometimes extend-
ed from non-sentient to sentient animals with a puta-
tively lesser capacity for suffering.46,55 Whether the
capacity for suffering varies among vertebrates (or
mammals) is highly controversial from both a biologi-
cal and a philosophical point of view.46,56–58
Nevertheless, a hierarchy is commonly applied, placing
primates, dogs and cats above other mammals, mam-
mals above birds and birds above fish. Although
animal welfare legislations generally protect all verte-
brates (and some invertebrates), some specific regula-
tions exist for ‘higher mammals’, such as primates,
dogs and cats. Such hierarchies are likely biased by
(Western) human preferences for close relatives (i.e.
non-human primates) and popular pets (i.e. cats and
dogs) rather than based on biological evidence.59
Nevertheless, researchers may shy away from studying
these animals out of moral concerns, higher bureau-
cratic burden or for fear of harassment by animal
rights groups. Instead of using the animal that max-
imises construct validity, they may choose research ani-
mals that are ethically less controversial. Second, the
choice of a model organism may sometimes be based
on researchers’ specialisation on a particular species
(e.g. mice), economic considerations (primate studies
are more expensive than rodent studies) or convenience
(e.g. access to facilities).
Careful evaluation of the implications of the model
organism for construct validity is of great importance
to the legitimacy of a study protocol. The aim to con-
tribute to a better understanding of the pathophysiol-
ogy of a human disease (e.g. Alzheimer’s) does not
necessarily justify the use of primates or other mam-
mals. Some aspects of such diseases can be studied in
vitro or by using invertebrate model organisms. It is
therefore important to assess model organisms based
on the specific study aims rather than the context of the
study. Also, ‘replacing’ primates by mice for ethical
reasons (‘relative replacement’) may miss the point if
it reduces the construct validity, and thus ultimately
benefit, more than the harm. More research into species
differences regarding their capacity for suffering,56 as
well as research into the ethical foundation of species
hierarchies, is needed to settle this issue.57
Since there is no strong relationship between con-
struct validity and sample size, there is little scope for
conflicts between construct validity and reduction.
There are, however, potential conflicts between con-
struct validity and refinement. Although pain and suf-
fering are potential confounders of most study
outcomes, the least severe procedure may not always
generate the highest construct validity. However,
because construct validity can only be assessed with
respect to the specific study aim, potential refinements
need to be assessed with respect to both reduction in
severity of the procedures (i.e. the harm side of the
HBA) and consequences for the construct validity of
the study findings (i.e. the benefit side of the HBA).
Consequently, conflicts between construct validity
and refinement need to be addressed in the HBA.
Internal validity versus 3Rs
Besides adoption of measures to prevent risks of bias
(i.e. randomisation, blinding, etc.), internal validity
essentially depends on appropriate control groups
(e.g. validated positive and negative controls) and an
adequate sample size. Both are rather technical aspects
of experimental design, for which excellent guidelines
and online tools are available (e.g. Experimental
Design Assistant https://eda.nc3rs.org.uk/ and
G*Power http://www.gpower.hhu.de). There is little
potential for conflicts between internal validity and
the 3Rs, except for conflicts between internal validity
and reduction. This is mirrored by the UK NC3Rs’
adaptation of ‘reduction’, which besides minimising
the number of animals per study also implies ‘that stud-
ies with animals are appropriately designed and ana-
lysed to ensure robust and reproducible findings’. It is
clear that studies lacking essential control groups or
statistical power will fail to produce sound evidence.
Thus, the minimal number of animals per study
should always be justified by the needs of valid infer-
ences with respect to the expected results and the
intended inference space.
As pain and suffering are potential confounders of
study outcomes, refinements are likely to improve
rather than compromise internal validity.9,10,30 Thus,
rather than conflicts, there are many synergies between
refinement and internal validity. However, as with con-
struct validity, should conflicts occur, they need to be
addressed by evaluating the consequences of the differ-
ent scenarios for the outcome of the HBA.
External validity versus 3Rs
There are also conflicts between external validity and
the 3Rs. Replacement and refinement can affect exter-
nal validity only indirectly via their effects on construct
validity. In contrast, there is a direct conflict between
external validity and reduction. Standardisation is
often promoted to reduce variation in results, thus min-
imising sample size to detect a treatment effect of a
given size.60 As discussed above, excessive standardisa-
tion may compromise external validity (by narrowing
the inference space) and thus reproducibility and gen-
eralisability of study findings. Therefore, gains in terms
of smaller sample sizes may be offset by the loss in
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external validity. Factorial study designs offer plenty of
opportunities to optimise study design in terms of
external validity and sample size. In particular, using
randomised block designs, sample size may be mini-
mised by standardisation within blocks, while external
validity may be maximised by heterogenisation
between blocks.33,45 Specific solutions to this trade-off
depend on the intended inference space and the sources
and magnitude of variation of factors that determine
the inference space.
Conclusions
We have shown that some conflicts and trade-offs
between the 3Vs and the 3Rs exist. However, they
can be resolved either by adequate study designs or
by ethical deliberation in the HBA. Importantly, the
3Vs and 3Rs, together with the HBA, enable a logically
structured procedure to arrive at scientifically informed
and morally justified decisions about the legitimacy of
animal study protocols. Careful assessment of both the
3Vs and 3Rs prior to the HBA is crucial for finding the
right balance between the two. Promoting the 3Rs at
the expense of the 3Vs may result in wasting animals
for inconclusive research. Promoting the 3Vs at the
expense of the 3Rs may result in inhumane research.
Outlook
The 3Rs and the HBA are well-established guiding
principles enshrined in national and international leg-
islation and guidelines (e.g. the European Commision,2
the US Department of Agriculture3 and the National
Research Council of the National Academies4).
However, there is a lack of a similar guiding principle
promoting the scientific validity of animal research. A
study in Switzerland recently showed that authorities
licensing animal experiments lack important informa-
tion about experimental design and conduct.18 As a
result, animal experiments were authorised based on
blind trust into their scientific validity rather than evi-
dence presented in study protocols (the application
form has now been changed). In light of accumulating
evidence of poor reproducibility in animal research,
voices calling for measures to improve scientific validity
are getting louder (e.g. Macleod,21 Stark61 and
Bishop62). The 3Vs offer a guiding principle for evalu-
ating the scientific validity of animal research in the
context of the HBA.5
The 3Vs are not the first proposal to include quality
of research more formally into project evaluation. For
example, Bateson’s famous decision cube63 included a
third dimension (besides harm and benefit) –‘impor-
tance of research’ – which covers scientific quality as
assessed by peer review in funding decisions. Later,
Porter64 proposed ethical scores for animal experi-
ments, including ‘that the experiment be well planned
and statistically sound and seeks a realistic judgment of
its exigency’. However, the 3Vs provide a much more
specific and formalised principle for evaluating whether
a study protocol is scientifically suitable. Moreover, the
3Vs are already operationalised and can be readily
implemented into project evaluation.
More recently, Strech and Dirnagl65 proposed a sim-
ilar framework that goes even further. They propose to
extend the original 3Rs by another set of three Rs to
cover the scientific value of research: robustness, regis-
tration and reporting. While robustness essentially
covers the 3Vs as discussed here, Strech and Dirnagl
consider an obligation for both the preregistration of
study protocols and the reporting of results as crucial
measures to guarantee scientific value. Their proposal
bears a certain risk of diluting the strong brand and
coherence of the 3Rs principle. Moreover, current law
and regulatory documents provide a regulatory basis
for implementing the 3Vs in project evaluation. This
is currently not the case for preregistration and report-
ing that do not have the same regulatory status in
animal research. Nevertheless, we strongly support
their call for preregistration and reporting as additional
requirements for improving the scientific value of
animal research, and hope that the necessary legal
and regulatory foundations for their implementation
will soon be laid.
Finally, DeGrazia and Beauchamp66 recently pro-
posed replacing the 3Rs principle (which they consider
inadequate for evaluating animal research ethics) by
three principles for animal welfare (no unnecessary
harm, basic needs and upper limits to harm) and
three principles for social benefit (no alternative meth-
ods, expected net benefit and sufficient value to justify
harm). Unfortunately, they mistook the 3Rs principle
for a framework for ethical evaluation, ignoring that
ethical evaluation is based on a comprehensive HBA.
Except for an ‘upper limit to harm’, all other ‘new’
principles are either covered by legal minimal standards
(‘basic needs’), the 3Rs (‘no alternative method’, ‘no
unnecessary harm’) or by the HBA (‘expected net ben-
efit’, ‘sufficient value to justify harm’). Moreover, the
EU Directive does actually set a limit on permissible
harm,2 and most other jurisdictions include some deon-
tological (i.e. animal rights based; e.g. ban on using
great apes), besides utilitarian, principles of animal
ethics. In fact, rather than demonstrating a need for
new principles, DeGrazia and Beauchamp argue for
more rigorous implementation of the current princi-
ples. Thus, all of their principles can be accommodated
within current frameworks; ‘basic needs’ and ‘upper
limits to harm’ are best regulated by minimal standards
in animal welfare law, ‘no alternative method’ and ‘no
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unnecessary harm’ are covered by the 3Rs and
‘expected net benefit’ and ‘sufficient value to justify
harm’ are accommodated by the HBA.
Taken together, we believe that the rule-of-law prin-
ciple of proportionality offers an ideal basis for an
effective framework of animal research ethics. We are
confident that it will be sufficiently robust to stand the
test of time by accommodating evolving shifts in scien-
tific and ethical standards.
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Resume
L’utilisation des animaux pour la recherche souleve des preoccupations ethiques qui sont abordees dans l’evaluation du projet
en comparant les prejudices attendus pour les animaux par rapport aux avantages attendus pour la societe. Une analyse
benefice-prejudice (HBA) repose sur deux conditions prealables, à savoir que (a) le protocole d’etude soit scientifiquement
approprie et (b) que l’utilisation d’animaux (sensibles) et les prejudices qui leur sont imposes soient necessaires pour atteindre
les objectifs de l’etude. Les 3R (remplacer, reduire et raffiner) fournissent un principe directeur pour evaluer si l’utilisation des
animaux, leur nombre et les prejudices qui leur sont imposes sont necessaires. Un principe directeur similaire pour evaluer si un
protocole d’etude est scientifiquement approprie a recemment ete propose: le principe 3V, qui fait reference aux trois princi-
paux aspects de validite scientifique dans la recherche animale (construction, validite interne et externe). Nous analysons ici la
coherence et la compatibilite internes de ces deux principes, abordons les conflits à l’interieur et entre les 3R et les 3V et
discutons de leurs implications pour l’evaluation du projet. Nous montrons qu’il existe quelques conflits et compromis, mais
que ceux-ci peuvent être resolus soit par des etudes appropriees, soit par des deliberations ethiques lors de l’analyse HBA. En
combinaison, les 3V, les 3R et l’analyse HBA offrent ainsi un cadre coherent pour qu’une procedure d’evaluation logiquement
structuree permette de decider de la legitimite des projets de recherche animale.
Abstract
Die Verwendung von Tieren zu Forschungszwecken wirft ethische Bedenken auf, die bei der Projektevaluierung durch
Abwiegen von zu erwartendem Schaden für die Tiere und zu erwartenden Nutzen für die Gesellschaft zu berücksichtigen
sind. Eine solche Schaden-Nutzen-Analyse (Harm-Benefit-Analyse, HBA) beruht auf zwei Voraussetzungen, n€amlich dass (a)
das Studienprotokoll wissenschaftlich geeignet ist und (b) die Verwendung von (empfindungsf€ahigen) Tieren und die ihnen
zugefügten Sch€aden für die Erreichung der Studienziele notwendig sind. Die 3R (Replace, Reduce, Refine) sind ein Leitprinzip
für die Beurteilung, ob der Einsatz von Tieren, ihre Anzahl und die ihnen zugefügten Sch€aden notwendig sind. Kürzlich wurde
ein €ahnliches Leitprinzip zur Beurteilung, ob ein Studienprotokoll wissenschaftlich geeignet ist, vorgeschlagen – das 3V-
Prinzip, das sich auf die drei Hauptaspekte der wissenschaftlichen Validit€at in der Tierforschung bezieht (Konstrukt-, interne
und externe Validit€at). Hier analysieren wir die interne Koh€arenz und Vereinbarkeit dieser beiden Prinzipien, gehen auf
Konflikte innerhalb und zwischen den 3R und 3V ein und diskutieren ihre Implikationen für die Projektevaluation. Wir
zeigen, dass es einige wenige Konflikte und Kompromisse gibt, die aber durch geeignete Studiendesigns oder durch ethische
Abw€agung bei der HBA aufgel€ost werden k€onnen. In Kombination bieten die 3V, 3R und die HBA somit einen koh€arenten
Rahmen für ein logisch strukturiertes Evaluationsverfahren zur Entscheidung über die Legitimit€at von Tierversuchsprojekten.
Resumen
Utilizar a animales para estudios de investigacion provoca preocupaciones eticas que se tratan en las evaluaciones de proyectos
en los que se ponderan los da~nos esperados a los animales frente a los beneficios previstos para la sociedad. Un análisis de
da~nos y ventajas (HBA) depende de dos prerrequisitos: (a) el protocolo del estudio debe ser cientıficamente adecuado y (b) el
uso de animales (sensibles) y los da~nos provocados a los mismos deben ser inevitables para conseguir los objetivos del estudio.
Las 3 R (Reemplazar, Reducir y Refinar) ofrecen un principio rector para evaluar si el uso de animales, el numero y los da~nos
provocados son realmente necesarios. Recientemente se ha adoptado otro principio rector para evaluar si un protocolo de
estudio es cientıficamente adecuado: el principio de las 3 V que hace referencia a los tres aspectos principales de validez
cientıfica en los estudios de investigacion con animales (crear validez interna y externa). Aquı analizamos la consistencia
interna y la compatibilidad de estos dos principios, además de tratar conflictos dentro y entre las 3 R y las 3 V, y debatimos sus
implicaciones para la evaluacion del proyecto. Mostramos que existen algunos conflictos y compensaciones, pero estos pueden
resolverse mediante dise~nos de estudio adecuados o a traves de una deliberacion etica en el HBA. En combinacion, las 3 R, las
3 V y el HBA ofrecen un marco coherente para llevar a cabo una evaluacion estructurada de forma logica para decidir la
legitimidad de los proyectos de investigacion con animales.
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